Oracle v. Google by Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
  
 
Nos. 17-1118, -1202 
 
 
IN THE  
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
 
 







On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Northern District of California 
No. 3:10-cv-03561-WHA Hon. William H. Alsup 
 
 
RESPONSE TO COMBINED PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC 
 
 
Dorian E. Daley 
Deborah K. Miller 
Matthew M. Sarboraria 
Ruchika Agrawal 
ORACLE AMERICA, INC. 
500 Oracle Parkway 
Redwood Shores, CA  94065 
 
Dale M. Cendali 
Joshua L. Simmons 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
601 Lexington Avenue 
New York, NY  10022 
 
E. Joshua Rosenkranz 
Annette L. Hurst 
Andrew D. Silverman 
ORRICK, HERRINGTON & 
    SUTCLIFFE LLP 
51 West 52nd Street 
New York, NY  10019 
(212) 506-5000  
 
Kelsi Brown Corkran 
Melanie L. Bostwick 
Jeremy Peterman 
ORRICK, HERRINGTON & 
    SUTCLIFFE LLP 
1152 15th Street NW 
Washington, DC  20005 
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant
Case: 17-1118      Document: 300     Page: 1     Filed: 07/27/2018
FORM 9. Cert ificate oflnteres t Form9 
Rev. 03/16 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
Oracle America, Inc. v . 
Case No. 17-1118, · 1202 
 CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST 
Counsel for the: 
0 (petitioner) ~ (appellant) 0 (respondent) 0 (appellee)O (amicus)O (name of party) 
Oracle America, Inc. 
certifies t he following (use "None" if applicable; use extra sheets if necessary): 
2. Name of Real Party in int erest 3. Parent corporations and 
1. Full N arne of Party (Please only include any real party publicly held companies 
Represented by me in int erest NOT identified in t hat own 10% or m ore of 
Question 3) r epresented by me is : stock in the party 
Oracle America, Inc. None Oracle Corporation 
4. The names of all law firms and the partner s or associates that appeared for the party or amicus 
now represen ted by me in t he trial court or agency or are expected to appear in th is court (and who 
have not or will not enter an appearance in this case) are: 
See Attachment A. 
Is/ E. J oshua Rosenln·anz 
Date Signature of counsel 
Please Note: All questions must be answered E. J oshua Rosenln·an z 
Printed name of counsel 
cc: Counsel of Record 
I Reset Fields I 
Case: 17-1118      Document: 300     Page: 2     Filed: 07/27/2018
ATTACHMENT A 
4. The following law firms and partners or associates appeared
for Oracle America, Inc. in the Northern District of California or are 
expected to appear in this Court (and have not or will not enter an 
appearance in this case):  
ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP 
Alyssa M. Caridis 
Jeffrey L. Cox 
Michelle O’Meara Cousineau 
Kelly M. Daley 
Vickie Feeman 
Melinda Haag 
Karen G. Johnson-McKewan 
Ayanna Lewis-Gruss 
Randall S. Luskey 
Elizabeth C. McBride (no longer with firm) 
Denise M. Mingrone 
Geoffrey G. Moss 
Gabriel M. Ramsey 
Nathan D. Shaffer 
Robert P. Varian 
Christina M. Von Der Ahe 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
Susan Davies 
Sean Fernandes (no longer with the firm) 
Diana M. Torres 
Case: 17-1118      Document: 300     Page: 3     Filed: 07/27/2018
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 
Richard S. Ballinger (no longer with firm) 
Michael A. Jacobs 
Rudolph Kim 
Kenneth A. Kuwayti 
Daniel P. Muino 
Marc David Peters 
Roman A. Swoopes 
Yuka Teraguchi 
Mark E. Ungerman (no longer with firm) 
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP 
David Boies 
Meredith R. Dearborn 
Steven C. Holtzman 
William F. Norton, Jr. (no longer with the firm) 
Beko Osiris Ra Reblitz-Richardson 
Alanna Rutherford 
Case: 17-1118      Document: 300     Page: 4     Filed: 07/27/2018
 iv 
 




CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST ........................................................ i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................. v 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................. 3 
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................... 7 
I. The Panel’s Application Of Ninth Circuit Law Does Not 
Warrant Rehearing. ................................................................ 7 
II. The Panel’s 2014 Copyrightability Decision Does Not 
Warrant Rehearing. ................................................................ 9 
A. This Court should not review an opinion that 
Google declined to present for rehearing when it 
issued four years ago. .................................................... 9 
B. Applying Ninth Circuit law, the panel correctly 
held Oracle’s original work copyrightable. ................. 10 
III. The Panel’s Fair-Use Decision Does Not Warrant 
Rehearing. ............................................................................. 14 
A. The standard of review in the Ninth Circuit does 
not warrant rehearing. ................................................ 14 
B. The panel’s sound application of Ninth Circuit 
transformative-use law does not warrant 
rehearing. ..................................................................... 15 
C. The panel did not overlook arguments. ...................... 18 
IV. There Is No Urgency To Rehear This Case. ........................ 19 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................... 1 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................ 1 
 
Case: 17-1118      Document: 300     Page: 5     Filed: 07/27/2018
 v 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
Cases 
Apple Comput., Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 
725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) ................................................................ 13 
Bikram’s Yoga College of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, 
803 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2015) .......................................................... 9, 12 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569 (1994) ........................................................................ 15, 18 
Dow Chem. Co. v. Nova Chems. Corp. (Canada), 
803 F.3d 620 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................................................................ 9 
Dr. Seuss, Enters. L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) .............................................................. 18 
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340 (1991) .............................................................................. 11 
Fisher v. Dees, 
794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) ................................................................ 14 
George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 
341 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .............................................................. 8 
Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539 (1985) ........................................................................ 14, 18 
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 
886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989) ........................................................ 11, 13 
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l 
750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................ 13 
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 
750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Oracle I”) . 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21 
Case: 17-1118      Document: 300     Page: 6     Filed: 07/27/2018
 vi 
 
Pentax Corp. v. Robison, 
135 F.3d 760 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .............................................................. 10 
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) ........................................................ 12, 18 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417 (1984) .................................................................. 12, 16, 18 
Stewart v. Abend, 
495 U.S. 207 (1990) ................................................................................ 2 
TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 
839 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2016) ................................................................. 18 
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. v.  
Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC 
138 S. Ct. 960 (2018) ............................................................................ 14 
Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 
227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) .............................................................. 16 
Statutes & Rules 
17 U.S.C. § 101.......................................................................................... 11 
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ............................................................................... 10, 11 
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ............................................................................... 10, 11 
17 U.S.C. § 103(a) ..................................................................................... 13 
17 U.S.C. § 107.......................................................................................... 17 
Fed. Cir. R. 35 (b)(2) ................................................................................... 7 
Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(1) .............................................................................. 7 
Other Authorities 
Brief of United States, Google Inc. v. Oracle Am., Inc.,  
No. 14-410, 2015 WL 2457656 ............................................................... 1 
Case: 17-1118      Document: 300     Page: 7     Filed: 07/27/2018
 vii 
 
BSA Foundation, The Growing $1 Trillion Economic Impact 
of Software (Sept. 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y77xjgke ...................... 20 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Google Inc. v. Oracle Am., Inc., 
No. 14-410, 2014 WL 5319724 ............................................................. 20 
 
Case: 17-1118      Document: 300     Page: 8     Filed: 07/27/2018
  
INTRODUCTION 
There is nothing “extraordinary” or “unusual,” Pet. 4, about the 
panel opinions in this case.   
What is extraordinary is seeking en banc review of decisions that 
turn entirely on Ninth Circuit law.  This Court has never granted 
rehearing en banc to consider a regional circuit’s law.  It simply does 
not satisfy the criteria for en banc review.   
Equally unusual is Google’s effort to seek review of a four-year-old 
decision in an earlier appeal that held Oracle’s work copyrightable.  
Google skipped the rehearing petition when that appeal was decided 
and failed to convince the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.  As the 
United States explained to the Court, the decision was “correct[],” and 
Google “identified no sound basis for further review.”  Brief of United 
States, Google Inc. v. Oracle Am., Inc., No. 14-410, 2015 WL 2457656, at 
*19.  Google recycles the same arguments here, which warrant the same 
result.  
Google also seeks review of the panel’s current ruling that 
Google’s unlicensed commercial use of Oracle’s copyrighted work was 
not fair use.  Google labels this decision “extraordinary” based on a 
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tweet claiming that “of the more than 300 decisions on fair use … only 
one other decision overturn[ed] a jury verdict on fair use.”  Pet. 4.  But 
Google fails to mention that hardly any of those cases went to a jury.  
By our count, there have been exactly five JMOL appeals from fair use 
jury verdicts in the last 24 years.  Resolving fair use as a matter of law 
is the norm.     
It is certainly proper on such extreme facts:  Oracle spent years 
writing packages of elegant software for the Java platform that 
appealed to a fan base of millions of app developers.  Google then copied 
11,500 lines of that expressive code into a competing platform for the 
express purpose of capturing Oracle’s fan base and competing against 
Oracle in the market.  Google’s copying was the equivalent of taking the 
most recognizable parts of a popular short story and turning them into 
a blockbuster movie without the author’s permission—something the 
Supreme Court deemed a “classic” unfair use.  Stewart v. Abend, 495 
U.S. 207, 238 (1990).  No court has ever held that it could be fair to copy 
this much original material and incorporate it into a competing product 
that displaces the original. 
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That is why Google and its amici are wrong in predicting that the 
panel opinion will undermine software innovation.  The panel followed 
existing law.  Google’s premise has always been that it may copy 
Oracle’s original code precisely because it has become wildly popular.  
Oracle I, 750 F.3d 1339, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  That principle is foreign 
to copyright law—and anathema to innovation.  No software company 
will ever invest the millions of dollars necessary to create such an 
innovative platform if competitors are free to plagiarize when it 
becomes popular. 
This Court should deny Google’s petition.  
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Oracle and its predecessor, Sun Microsystems, created and 
continuously improved the Java platform to appeal to a community of 
developers who write their own apps.  Relevant here are the Java 
platform’s thousands of prewritten programs known as application 
programming interfaces or “APIs” that “programmers … use … to build 
certain functions into their own programs.”  Op. 8.   
The Java APIs contain both “declaring code” and “implementing 
code.”  “Declaring code” (what Google copied verbatim) is like the 
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chapter headings and topic sentences of an elaborate literary work:  It 
introduces, names, and describes each pre-written program to help app 
developers learn and remember what those pre-written programs do, 
and how they interrelate, while writing their own code.  App developers 
invoke the declaring code to incorporate a desired prewritten program 
into an app.  Each portion of declaring code is associated with particular 
“implementing code,” which tells the computer how to perform the pre-
written function.  Id. 
“[D]esigning the Java API packages was a creative process.”   
Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1356.  Oracle painstakingly wrote expressive 
declaring code and organized the programs into an intricate structure 
and organization—all with a view toward making the platform 
attractive and intuitive to a vast fan base of millions of app developers.  
None of these creative choices were dictated by function.  Id. 
Google likes to say that Oracle’s code was “free and open” for all to 
use.  Pet. 6.  But Oracle made its code available only by license.  Op. 9.  
App developers who used the platform to write apps could take a non-
royalty-bearing license.  But critically, Oracle never let competitors or 
device manufacturers freely copy its code to build competing platforms.  
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Id.  Before Google began marketing Android using Oracle’s work, Oracle 
successfully licensed the Java platform for desktop and laptop 
computers, as well as for smartphones (like Danger), for tablets (like 
Amazon Kindle), and for development of a smartphone platform 
(SavaJe).  Op. 51-52. 
The panel’s opinion lays out Google’s brazen copying in full color.  
Op. 10-11.  To summarize:  In 2005, Google wanted to quickly develop a 
programming platform for mobile devices to protect its revenue from 
search-engine advertising.  Google needed to attract Java developers to 
build apps for it.  Op. 10.  To speed the development and adoption of its 
platform—Android—Google copied 11,500 lines of Oracle’s declaring 
code and the exact structure and organization of the 37 API packages 
most relevant to attract Java mobile-app developers.  Id.  Google also 
made Android incompatible with Java so that apps written for Android 
would not run on the Java platform.  Op. 47 n.11.  Android generated 
over $42 billion for Google as of 2016.  It cost Oracle existing customers 
and blocked its entry into developing markets.  Op. 10-11, 51-53.   
Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement.  The original jury 
found Google infringed Oracle’s copyright but hung on fair use.  
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Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1347-48.  After trial, the district court held the 
code Google copied devoid of copyright protection.  Id.  In 2014, this 
Court reversed, holding both Oracle’s declaring code and its structure 
and organization subject to copyright protection.  Id.  Google did not 
seek rehearing but petitioned for certiorari.  The United States, as 
amicus, opposed Google’s petition.  The Supreme Court denied it.    
The case returned to district court for a retrial on Google’s fair-use 
defense.  The second jury concluded that Google’s use was fair, and the 
district court denied Oracle’s JMOL motion.  Op. 7.  Oracle appealed, 
and the panel reversed.  The panel “assume[d] that the jury resolved all 
factual issues relating to the historical facts in favor of the verdict” and, 
following Ninth Circuit law, carefully analyzed each of the fair-use 
factors in light of those historical facts.  Op. 25.   
Based upon undisputed facts, the panel concluded that factor one 
(the purpose and character of the copied use) weighed against fair use.  
Google’s use was “overwhelmingly commercial.”  Op. 28-30.  And it was 
not “transformative” because Google “made no alteration to the 
expressive content or message of the copyrighted material” and used it 
for the “same … purpose” in the same “smartphone[] … context.”  Op. 
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30-39.  The second factor (the nature of the copied work) weighed in 
Google’s favor, Op. 44, and the third (the amount taken) was neutral or 
favored Oracle, given the code’s conceded importance, Op. 44-48.  The 
fourth factor (harm to existing and potential markets) “weigh[ed] 
heavily in favor of Oracle” in light of the unrebutted evidence that 
Android caused Oracle to lose customers and impaired Oracle’s ability 
to “license its work for mobile devices.”  Op. 48-53.   
“Weighing these factors together, [the panel] conclude[d] that 
Google’s use of the declaring code and [structure and organization] of 
the 37 API packages was not fair as a matter of law.”  Op. 54.   
ARGUMENT 
I. The Panel’s Application Of Ninth Circuit Law Does Not 
Warrant Rehearing.  
Last time, Google did not seek rehearing.  And for good reason:  
The question whether a panel of this Court correctly applied Ninth 
Circuit law is not worthy of en banc review.  This Court reserves its en 
banc power for exceptional cases—those that present a need to “secure 
or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions” or “precedent-setting 
questions of exceptional importance.”  Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(1), Fed. Cir. 
R. 35 (b)(2) (emphases added).  Where the answer to a question will not 
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“create a precedent,” en banc review is unwarranted.  George E. Warren 
Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 1348, 1352 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  A case 
involving purely regional circuit law does not meet these criteria, and 
Google does not seriously argue otherwise.  Indeed, we have found no 
instance of this Court ever reviewing en banc a question controlled by 
regional circuit law. 
Google proclaims the panel’s application of Ninth Circuit law “is 
now a Federal Circuit problem,” because plaintiffs might increasingly 
append patent claims to their copyright cases.  Pet. 21.  Google musters 
only two examples in five years of this supposed problem.  Id.  It also 
misses the point.  Those cases will always be governed by the law of the 
various regional circuits.  They will never involve questions of Federal 
Circuit law.  Future panels will be required to reach the results dictated 
by the relevant regional circuit regardless of what this Court holds en 
banc.   
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II. The Panel’s 2014 Copyrightability Decision Does Not 
Warrant Rehearing.  
A. This Court should not review an opinion that Google 
declined to present for rehearing when it issued four 
years ago. 
Google’s lead argument challenges a 2014 decision resolving a 
prior appeal in this litigation.  “[L]aw of the case posits that when a 
court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern 
the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.”  Dow Chem. Co. 
v. Nova Chems. Corp. (Canada), 803 F.3d 620, 627 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(quotation marks omitted).  Copyrightability became such a “decide[d]” 
issue when Google declined to seek rehearing, the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari, and the parties pursued three years of fair-use 
litigation premised on the correctness of that ruling.  Google offers no 
justification for skipping en banc review the first time and no reason 
why this Court should revisit a now-final ruling.   
Worse, Google presents to the en banc Court an argument that it 
waived before the panel.  Google argues that intervening Ninth Circuit 
law undermines Oracle I.  Pet. 10 (citing Bikram’s Yoga College of 
India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, 803 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2015)).  In the 
latest appeal, Google included Bikram’s in a string cite before the panel, 
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but chose neither to “ask[] the panel for relief on the copyrightability 
issue nor offer[] any arguments on that issue.”  Op. 55.  This Court 
should follow its usual practice and “decline to address the … new 
theory raised for the first time in [Google’s] petition for rehearing.”  
Pentax Corp. v. Robison, 135 F.3d 760, 762 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
B. Applying Ninth Circuit law, the panel correctly held 
Oracle’s original work copyrightable.  
As the United States explained to the Supreme Court, the panel’s 
2014 copyrightability decision was “correct.”  Supra 1. 
“The Copyright Act provides protection to ‘original works of 
authorship’”—which all agree include computer programs.  Oracle I, 750 
F.3d at 1354-55 (quoting § 102(a)).  The panel held Oracle’s declaring 
code, and the code’s structure and organization, copyright-protected 
because they are creative expression that all agreed qualified as 
original works under § 102(a).  Id. at 1355-56. 
Google contends that Oracle’s work is a “system” or “method of 
operation” under § 102(b) and that the panel erred in holding that 
§ “102(b) does not exclude systems or methods of operation from 
copyright protection.”  Pet. 8-9.  That is not what the panel held.  
Rather, following Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, the 
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panel recognized that § 102(b) does not extinguish the copyright 
protection that § 102(a) grants.  750 F.3d at 1354-55; see Feist Publ’ns, 
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 356 (1991) (§ 102(b) “in no 
way … contracts the scope of copyright protection”; its “purpose is to 
restate ... the basic dichotomy between expression and idea”); Johnson 
Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175-76 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (software’s “structure, sequence, and organization” is 
copyrightable if “the component in question qualifies as an expression of 
an idea”).  Section 102(b) means that just because a work has copyright 
protection (under § 102(a)) does not mean the protection “extend[s]” to 
the underlying “ideas,” “systems,” and “methods of operation” that the 
author describes in the work.  Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1355-57 (quoting 
§ 102(b)).  Because the declaring code and its structure and organization 
were protected expression—not an idea, system, or method of 
operation—the panel correctly held them copyrightable.  Id.   
Google is wrong that Oracle’s code is an uncopyrightable “method 
of operat[ion]” because the code “instruct[s] a computer to carry out 
desired operations.”  Pet. 10.  That would be true of all computer 
programs.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “computer program[s],” as “a set of 
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statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a 
computer in order to bring about a certain result”).  So that rule would 
nullify Congress’s decision to make computer programs copyrightable.  
Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1367.  
The Ninth Circuit cases Google and its amici cite are not to the 
contrary.  Pet. 10.  The panel thoroughly considered Sega and Sony and 
rejected Google’s argument for several reasons.  Most notably—they are 
not copyrightability decisions.  Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1369.   
Even if Google had preserved its argument about Bikram’s Yoga, 
but see supra 9-10, it changes nothing.  Bikram’s held that a “healing 
methodology” comprised of a series of yoga poses was not copyrightable 
because “medical and functional considerations” “compel[led]” 
arranging the poses in a “strict order.”  803 F.3d at 1039-40, 1042.  
Here, however, it was undisputed that Oracle had an unlimited number 
of ways to write and organize the ideas in its code, such that functional 
considerations did not dictate the specific expression Oracle chose.  
Supra 4.  Bikram’s did not call into question the Ninth Circuit’s 
Johnson Controls decision—ignored by Google and its amici—that 
software code is copyrightable whenever it “qualifies as an expression of 
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an idea.”  886 F.2d at 1175-76 (emphasis added).  Google instead relies 
on a portion of Birkam’s that holds the yoga sequence could not qualify 
for copyright protection as a compilation under § 103(a), when this case 
is not about compilations.1 
Lastly, Google argues that the panel misapplied the merger 
doctrine, which precludes copyright protection where the idea and 
expression “merge[].”  Pet. 11.  It reasons that “[i]f Google did not use 
the API’s declarations … programmers could not have used the familiar 
shorthand commands” that Oracle made so popular.  Id.  But the panel 
followed Ninth Circuit law holding that the merger analysis applies “at 
the time of creation [by Oracle], not at the time of infringement [by 
Google].”  Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1361 (citing Apple Comput., Inc. v. 
Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1984)).   
                                      
1 The panel explained why the First Circuit’s Lotus decision is 
consistent with its copyrightability holding.  Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1365.  
Moreover, any conflict would be irrelevant because Ninth Circuit law 
governs here.   
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III. The Panel’s Fair-Use Decision Does Not Warrant 
Rehearing. 
A. The standard of review in the Ninth Circuit does not 
warrant rehearing.  
The panel correctly reviewed “the ultimate determination of fair 
use” “de novo.”  Pet. 12.  The controlling law is clear: “the ultimate 
conclusions to be drawn from the admitted facts [in a fair use 
case] ... are legal in nature.”  Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 
1986); accord Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 560 (1985) (“Where the district court has found facts sufficient to 
evaluate each of the statutory factors, an appellate court … may 
conclude as a matter of law that the challenged use does not qualify as 
a fair use ….”).  The panel thoroughly explained how the recent 
Supreme Court bankruptcy decision U.S. Bank further supports de novo 
review.  Op. 19-20.  This Court should not sit en banc to predict how the 
Ninth Circuit would apply U.S. Bank.      
Google mischaracterizes the panel decision when it asserts that 
the panel “adopted as fact a large number of disputed Oracle 
assertions.”  Pet. 13.  The panel explicitly “resolved all factual issues 
relating to the historical facts in favor of the verdict.”  Op. 25.  Google’s 
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fact-specific contention to the contrary is not worthy of en banc review.  
Regardless, it fails because most of Google’s examples are unsupported 
by the record citations this Court needs to assess its argument.  See Pet. 
14 n.2.  Where Google does offer citations, there is no material dispute.  
Taking Google’s three examples (at 13-14) in order:  Google’s witnesses 
testified that Java SE was in a modern smartphone, Oracle Reply 13; 
caselaw establishes that unauthorized use weighs against fair use even 
if the work is free, id. at 44; and Google conceded that “only” 170 lines 
of code were “technically necessary” to use the Java language, Oral Arg. 
at 24:45-25:30.    
B. The panel’s sound application of Ninth Circuit 
transformative-use law does not warrant rehearing. 
The panel correctly held that Google’s copying is non-
transformative under Ninth Circuit law.  Op. 30-39.  The panel applied 
the established test: “[a] use is ‘transformative’ if it ‘adds something 
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning or message.’”  Op. 30 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).  
The panel correctly found that Google’s use failed that test.  Every line 
of code Google copied into Android serves the same purpose and 
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communicates the same message as the original code.  “Google made no 
alteration to the expressive content or message of the copyrighted 
material.”  Op. 33.   
Google contends the panel erred in concluding “Google’s use was 
not transformative primarily because … the copied declarations … 
serve ‘an identical function and purpose’ in Android.”  Pet. 15.  But 
copying a work and using it for the same purpose as the original 
“seriously weakens [the] claimed fair use.”  Op. 31 (quoting Worldwide 
Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th 
Cir. 2000)).  Moreover, the panel’s holding rests on Google’s failure to 
alter the work’s expression or meaning, not on an absolute rule that 
“similarity of uses and functions” can never be transformative.  Pet. 15.  
Citing Sony, the panel recognized that copying code for a similar 
purpose can be “modestly transformative” when done to learn about the 
“unprotected” ideas in a computer program in order to create “a wholly 
new product” with “entirely new … code.”  Op. 34 (citing Sony).  But, 
unlike Sony, Google copied protected expression, not to reverse 
engineer, but to put the copied code directly into a competing 
commercial product.  Id.    
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Google’s inability to explain how it changed the meaning or 
message communicated by Oracle’s code is also why the panel correctly 
concluded that it was “irrelevant” that Google wrote its own 
implementing code.  Pet. 16.  Google made “no suggestion that the new 
implementing code somehow changed the expression or message of the 
declaring code.”  Op. 36.  
Google argues the panel “erred by focusing on transformation of 
the declarations, as opposed to” Java and Android “as a whole.”  Pet. 16.  
But the panel thoroughly compared Oracle’s and Google’s works and 
rejected Google’s argument.  Op. 36-37.  It found undisputed evidence 
established that Java and Android shared the same purpose.  Id. (“the 
record showed that Java SE APIs were in smartphones before Android 
entered the market”).   
In any event, Google is wrong about the proper focus.  Oracle 
Reply 16-17.  Congress directed courts to determine “the purpose and 
character of the use,” meaning the infringing use of the copyrighted 
material that the defendant seeks to establish as fair.  17 U.S.C. § 107 
(emphasis added).  Thus, in Campbell, the Supreme Court focused on 
how the new work changed the meaning of the copied verses by using 
Case: 17-1118      Document: 300     Page: 25     Filed: 07/27/2018
  
18 
them as part of a “play on words” with “juxtapos[ition]” to “comment on 
the naiveté of the original.”  510 U.S. at 582-83 (citation omitted).  That 
is also how the Ninth Circuit analyzes transformative use.  See Dr. 
Seuss, Enters. L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 
(9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing use of the expropriated elements of the 
original in the new work: “the Cat’s stove-pipe hat, the narrator, and 
the title.”); accord TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 180 
(2d Cir. 2016). 
At bottom, Google’s argument rests on the assertion that under 
the panel’s approach “virtually no use of any element of a computer 
program could ever be transformative.”  Pet. 15.  But the panel said it 
did “not conclude that a fair use defense could never be sustained in an 
action involving the copying of computer code.”  Op. 54 (citing Sega and 
Sony).  More importantly, it has never been fair to copy a work and put 
it to the exact same use at the expense of the original.  Harper & Row, 
471 U.S. at 550.   
C. The panel did not overlook arguments.  
Google complains that the panel overlooked its argument that its 
use was fair because “a ‘reasonable copyright owner’ would have 
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consented to the use.”  Pet. 18 (citation omitted).  The panel quoted this 
very argument, Op. 17, and properly rejected it, Op. 41.   
Amici also complain about ignored arguments.  But Google 
“abandoned the arguments” about “interoperability” that amici press.  
Op. 47 n.11.   Google likewise disclaimed its amici’s arguments about 
factor 2’s importance, telling the panel “market harm is the most 
important factor.”  Google Br. 68.  The panel nonetheless acknowledged 
that “functional considerations were both substantial and important” 
and gave that consideration due weight, resolving factor 2 in Google’s 
favor.  Op. 44. 
IV. There Is No Urgency To Rehear This Case. 
Google and its amici raise alarms about dire consequences.  They 
concede that “software can generally be protected by copyright.”  Pet. 5.  
Yet they insist that the panel upset settled “law … recogniz[ing] … that 
[software developers] are free to use existing computer software 
interfaces.”  Pet. 3.  But they cite no case that has ever held it is 
permissible to copy thousands of lines of code into a competing product 
that supersedes the original in the marketplace.   
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Nor did the panel make grand pronouncements about the 
copyrightability of interfaces or “the basic building blocks of computer 
design and programming.”  Pet. 20-21.  Some interfaces may be devoid 
of expression and thus not copyrightable.  The panel painstakingly 
assessed the unique work here on the specific record before it, according 
to basic copyright principles.   
The panel’s adherence to settled law also refutes Google’s 
assertion that the decision will cause “crippling liability and … new 
barriers to innovation” for the software industry.  Pet. 19-20.  Google 
made the same dire warning to the Supreme Court four years ago, see 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Google Inc. v. Oracle Am., Inc., No. 14-
410, 2014 WL 5319724 at *36, yet offers not a shred of proof that its 
doomsday scenario has transpired.  To the contrary, software 
innovation has thrived since then.  See BSA Foundation, The Growing 
$1 Trillion Economic Impact of Software (Sept. 2017), 
https://tinyurl.com/y77xjgke.   
Google’s doomsday scenario is unfounded.  Under the panel 
decision, app developers may continue to use the Java APIs for free.  
The decision merely prohibits what only Google has done: copying 
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Oracle’s work into a competing commercial platform without abiding by 
Oracle’s licensing scheme.  Oracle I, 750 F.3d at 1360 n.5.   Allowing 
such plagiarism is what would constitute a “devastating” blow to “the 
computer software industry.”  Pet. 3. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should deny Google’s petition. 
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